Why do people engage in collective action? Revisiting the role of perceived effectiveness by Hornsey, Matthew J. et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Hornsey, MJ, Blackwood, L, Louis, W, Fielding, K, Mavor, K, Morton, T, O'Brien, A, Paasonen, KE, Smith, J &
White, KM 2006, 'Why do people engage in collective action? Revisiting the role of perceived effectiveness',
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, vol. 36, no. 7, pp. 1701-1722. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-
9029.2006.00077.x
DOI:
10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00077.x
Publication date:
2006
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Hornsey, MJ, Blackwood, L, Louis, W, Fielding, K,
Mavor, K, Morton, T, O'Brien, A, Paasonen, KE, Smith, J & White, KM 2006, 'Why do people engage in
collective action? Revisiting the role of perceived effectiveness' Journal of Applied Social Psychology, vol 36, no.
7, pp. 1701-1722., which has been published in final form at 10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00077.x.  This article
may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
 1
RUNNING HEAD: Effectiveness and collective action 
 
Why Do People Engage In Collective Action? 
Revisiting The Role Of Perceived Effectiveness 
 
Matthew J. Hornsey 
(University of Queensland) 
 
Leda Blackwood 
(University of Queensland) 
 
Winnifred Louis 
(University of Queensland) 
 
Kelly Fielding 
(University of Queensland) 
 
Ken Mavor  
(Australian National University) 
 
Thomas Morton 
(University of Exeter) 
 
Anne O’Brien 
(University of Exeter) 
 
Karl-Erik Paasonen 
(University of Queensland) 
 
Joanne Smith 
(University of Queensland) 
 
Katherine M. White 
(Queensland University of Technology) 
  
 
 
Address correspondence to Dr Matthew Hornsey, School of Psychology, University of 
Queensland, St Lucia 4072, Queensland, Australia.  
Fax: +61 7 3365 4466  Ph: +61 7 3365 6378 E-mail: m.hornsey@psy.uq.edu.au 
 2
Abstract 
Research has shown only limited support for the notion that perceived effectiveness of collective 
action is a predictor of people’s intentions to engage in collective action. One reason for this may 
be that effectiveness has been defined rather narrowly in terms of whether the action will influence 
key decision makers. In addition to influencing decision makers, we argue that the effectiveness of 
collective action might be judged by other criteria, such as whether it is effective in influencing 
third parties, building an oppositional movement, and expressing values. Two hundred and thirty 
one attendees at a rally filled out a questionnaire examining the perceived effectiveness of the rally 
across the four hypothesized dimensions and their intentions to engage in future collective action. 
For those participants who were not members of an organization, future intentions were linked to 
the perceived effectiveness of the rally in expressing values and influencing the general public. For 
those who were members of an organization, future intentions were linked only to the perceived 
effectiveness of the rally in building an oppositional movement. Perceptions of how effective the 
rally was in influencing decision makers were not related to intentions for either members or non-
members. Implications for models of collective action are discussed. 
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Why Do People Engage In Collective Action? 
Revisiting The Role Of Perceived Effectiveness 
 
It is well documented that people’s concerns about social and economic issues do not necessarily 
translate into collective action (Klandermans, 2002; Olson, 1968). For example, a 1983 Gallup poll 
(cited in Fox & Schofield, 1989) revealed that approximately 40% of people in the US believed it 
was likely that there would be nuclear war by 1998, and 70% believed that they would not survive 
a nuclear war. Despite this, surveys in the 1980s showed that only a very small minority of people 
engaged in collective action to try to prevent the proliferation of nuclear missiles (Hamilton, Knox, 
Keilin, & Chavez, 1987). This gulf between perceived threat and collective action is apparent also 
in laboratory studies in which participants are discriminated against (e.g., Lalonde & Cameron, 
1994; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright & Taylor, 1998; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). 
An unexpected but common finding of these studies is that collective action is frequently 
nominated as a less attractive strategy than individual action or even acceptance. This is despite 
the fact that collective action is traditionally considered to be a prerequisite for social change 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
 
Over the last 40 years, considerable attention has been paid to this apparent paradox: Why are 
concerned individuals so reluctant to engage in collective action? One intuitive position is that 
people avoid collective action because they see it to be ineffective. In the case of nuclear 
proliferation, for example, it could be that people feel as though they are powerless to stop the 
course of events, and so they learn to stop trying. This is not an irrational belief. In Australia in 
2000, an estimated 1 million people (5% of the population) participated in marches requesting that 
the government apologize to indigenous Aborigines for aggressive assimilationist policies 
implemented between the 1930s and 1960s. At the time of writing, the Australian government has 
not apologized. In 2003, millions of people in the US, England, and Australia protested against the 
 4
declaration of war in Iraq, but these countries committed troops to the war regardless. When 
people make personal sacrifices to engage in collective action (in terms of time, money, and so 
forth) and then see an apparent indifference to this action on behalf of those in power, it is 
reasonable to expect that concerned individuals might eventually sink into a state of passivity and 
alienation (see Bynner & Ashford, 1994, for a broader discussion of political disaffection). 
 
According to this argument, people should be more inclined to engage in collective action the 
more effective they feel this action would be in bringing about change (Abramson & Aldrich, 
1982; Verba & Nie, 1972). Consistent with this notion, research has shown moderate but 
significant links between perceived effectiveness and intentions to engage in collective action. For 
example, an analysis of members of environmental organizations in the Netherlands revealed a 
positive relationship between perceptions of effectiveness and intentions to engage in collective 
action (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002). Similarly, moderate to high pairwise correlations have been 
found between measures of personal efficacy (i.e., judgements that one’s personal actions can 
bring about desired change) and intentions to engage in collective action with regard to nuclear 
war (Tyler & McGraw, 1983; Wolf, Gregory, & Stephan, 1986). Smaller but significant 
relationships between efficacy and intentions have also emerged in research on willingness to 
attend union meetings (Flood, 1993) and willingness to engage in political action among African 
Americans (Berman & Wittig, 2004). Fox and Schofield (1989) found that those who scored 
highly on a measure of “nuclear efficacy” (e.g., “Nuclear war can be prevented through active 
citizen efforts to convince world powers to disarm”) were more likely to sign a petition supporting 
bilateral disarmament than were those who scored low on this scale, although nuclear efficacy did 
not relate significantly to intentions to engage in collective action. Finally, Locatelli and Holt 
(1986) found that antinuclear activists who rated themselves as low on a global measure of 
“political powerlessness” (i.e., high on perceived efficacy) reported significantly stronger levels of 
antinuclear activism. 
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Despite these reasonably consistent results, other studies have shown that effectiveness 
perceptions tell only part of the story of why people engage in collective action. Klandermans and 
Oegema (1987), for example, interviewed 114 Dutch participants shortly before a major rally 
protesting against NATO’s decision to deploy cruise missiles in Europe. Revealingly, the authors 
found that “None of the respondents was very optimistic about the effectiveness of the 
demonstration; those who intended to demonstrate were no exception. None of them believed that 
the deployment of the cruise missiles could be stopped” (p. 527, italics added). This disconnection 
between perceptions of effectiveness and intentions to engage in collective action was detected 
also by Schofield and Pavelchak (1989) who examined people’s attitudes toward nuclear war 
before and after watching a movie depicting nuclear holocaust. After watching the movie, 
participants reported a decreased sense that they had the ability to prevent nuclear war, and at the 
same time an increased intention to engage in anti-nuclear activism.  
 
More recent work on the role of identity in predicting intentions to engage in collective action has 
contributed to a de-emphasis on effectiveness considerations. In line with social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Simon and colleagues (1998) argued that a major 
contributor to whether people engage in collective action is the extent to which they internalize 
their identity as an activist. Simon and colleagues compared the predictive value of identity 
measures with cost-benefit analyses measured at the collective, social, and individual levels. The 
construct most relevant to the current analysis is the collective level, which was operationalized by 
identifying goals of the movement and measuring the extent to which participants (a) valued these 
goals and (b) expected that a sufficient number of people could be mobilized to achieve these 
goals. In line with Klanderman’s (1984) expectancy-value approach, the “collective motive” was 
calculated as a multiplicative function of these two considerations. The authors found that 
identification as an activist significantly predicted intentions to engage in collective action among 
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members of the older people’s movement in Germany (Study 1) and members of the gay 
movement in the US (Study 2). In contrast, the collective motive was a weaker predictor of 
intentions and was not significantly associated with past activist behaviours. The authors proposed 
that there are at least two independent pathways to willingness to engage in collective action; a 
pathway that involves the weighing up of costs and benefits associated with activism, and a second 
pathway derived from identity issues. According to the model, identification as an activist is 
associated directly with activism intentions independently of “rational” cost-benefit analyses 
considerations. Rather, high identifiers act out the behaviours associated with their activist identity 
without explicitly considering the costs and benefits of their actions (see also Kelly & Breinlinger, 
1995a). 
 
Subsequent research on the dual pathway model found robust support for the predictive value of 
activist identification, and weaker support for the role of effectiveness. Using a similar measure of 
the collective motive as Simon and colleagues (1998), Sturmer and Simon (2004) found that 
perceptions of collective effectiveness among members of the German gay movement did not 
predict participation in collective protest as measured 12 months later. Using a slightly different 
measure of the expectancy component of the collective motive (the extent to which the goals of the 
group could be achieved by participating in group activities), Sturmer, Simon, Loewy, and Jorger 
(2003) again found no relationship between expectancies and willingness to engage in future 
activities of the fat acceptance movement. In each case, identification with the social movement 
was a strong predictor, reinforcing the notion that collective action can be a direct expression of an 
identity rather than an outcome of cost-benefit analyses, including perceptions of effectiveness. 
This research broadly corresponds to earlier research by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995b), who 
showed that perceived group effectiveness positively predicted the extent to which women 
engaged in women’s group activities in the ensuing 12 months. However, when identification as 
an activist was included as a predictor, effectiveness was not uniquely predictive of behaviors or 
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intentions to engage in collective action. The fact that the predictive power of effectiveness 
dropped out when activist identification was included suggests that the relationship between 
perceptions of effectiveness and collective action is an artefact of high inter-correlations between 
effectiveness and activist identity, and that it is the latter construct that has the true explanatory 
power. This suggests that one needs to look sceptically at previously established links between 
effectiveness and intentions in which identity measures were not included as predictors (e.g., 
Flood, 1993; Tyler & McGraw, 1983; Wolf et al., 1986). 
 
Reconceptualizing “Effectiveness” 
In summary, despite the intuitive appeal of the notion that perceptions of effectiveness would be 
crucial in determining whether or not people engage in collective action, the evidence for such a 
relationship is mixed, and there is recent research to suggest that perceptions of collective 
effectiveness might play no role in predicting intentions over and above ratings of activist 
identification (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995b; Sturmer et al., 2003; Sturmer & Simon, 2004). In this 
paper, we argue that the lack of support for the role of effectiveness might be partly a function of 
the fact that this construct has been defined in a relatively narrow manner, and that a more nuanced 
conceptualization of effectiveness might uncover relationships that have been obscured previously. 
 
In the past literature on collective action, effectiveness has been operationalized in a number of 
different ways. Some researchers have measured it as a generalized sense that individuals can 
influence the political process (e.g., Locatelli & Holt, 1986), whereas others have measured it as a 
belief that the specific, material goals of the group can be achieved. Among those who 
operationalized it in terms of the specific goals of the group, effectiveness has been interpreted 
variously as the sense that the individual can contribute successfully to achieving the goals (Kelly 
& Breinlinger, 1995b; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989; Sturmer et al., 2003; Wolf et al., 1986), the 
sense that enough people can be mobilized to achieve the goals (Berman & Wittig, 2004; Simon et 
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al., 1998; Sturmer & Simon, 2004), or more directly as the sense that the group is capable of 
bringing about the desired change (Flood, 1993; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Tyler & McGraw, 1983). 
What unites all these conceptualizations is that they treat effectiveness strictly in terms of whether 
the collective action would influence decision makers and win the desired outcomes for the group. 
We argue, however, that people could use at least three other criteria for determining whether a 
particular piece of collective action might be perceived as effective. Specifically, we argue that in 
addition to conceptualizing effectiveness in terms of influencing key decision makers, collective 
actions may also vary in the extent to which they are seen to be effective in satisfying intragroup, 
broader societal, and individual motivations.1 These criteria for effectiveness are discussed in more 
depth below. 
 
In their analysis of politicized collective identity, Simon and Klandermans (2001) made the 
important point that much political activity involves an interaction between the ingroup (the 
protestors, or members of a social movement), the outgroup or opponent (e.g., government), and 
relevant third parties (e.g., the general public). In many cases, group members might seek to go 
beyond the power struggle between their group and the outgroup and to convince third parties that 
they are part of the broader societal power struggle (see Reicher & Hopkins, 1996, for a related 
argument). In this way, members of each group try to win support and alignments from the broader 
population. This, of course, has implications for what are considered to be effective strategies for 
collective action. If people stage a rally and march through the streets, it is likely that they do so 
with the hope that decision makers and policy makers will be either intimidated or persuaded by 
what the march represents. It is also possible, however, that the intended audience extends to third 
parties; those who are not engaged currently in collective action but are not aligned to the outgroup 
either, and who can be recruited to the cause. In this case, effectiveness might not be measured by 
how many concessions they obtain from the relevant outgroup (e.g., policy makers), but by the 
extent to which the rally shifts the sympathies and allegiances of neutral observers. 
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Alternatively, effectiveness may be judged not on the basis of perceived influence per se, but 
rather in terms of whether it is successful in strengthening solidarity and strategic connections 
within the group. Activists may be responding to the perception that increased cohesiveness and 
coordination is an ingredient in more effective social mobilization (Kinder, 1998). In other words, 
the intended audience might not be outsiders at all but rather the protestors themselves. This might 
particularly be the case when the movement is not defined by an organization but rather by a set of 
ideologies or principles. Protests against globalization or war, for example, can encompass a 
dizzyingly large number of individual organizations and entities who might normally have little to 
do with each other, but are bound together by a set of ideological perspectives and goals. A 
collective act such as a rally might be the only time that these groups are brought together. Fuelled 
by physical proximity and a shared voice, rallies can help knit splintered individuals and groups 
into a more coherent force, from which basis future collective action might be more influential. 
Rather than focusing on short-term influence, the aims of a piece of collective action might be to 
“rally the troops” in the hope of exerting change in the long-term. In these situations, effectiveness 
can be interpreted in terms of how successful the collective action is in building an oppositional 
movement (it should be noted that there are broad parallels between this process-oriented view of 
effectiveness and the tenets of resource mobilization theory; see Klandermans, 1984, for a review). 
 
Finally, we argue that in some cases acts of collective action are not driven entirely by perceptions 
of influence or by the need to build an oppositional movement, but also by a simple need for 
expression of values. Expressing one’s own values publicly might partially be motivated by the 
need to influence others, but public expression might also have a positive impact on the individual 
independent of instrumental considerations. Attitude theorists have long argued that attitudes have 
an expressive function in that they act as a marker of group membership and/or personal values 
(e.g., Anderson & Kristiansen, 1990; Herek, 1987; Katz, 1960). Furthermore, Tice (1992) argued 
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that public acts of defiance help nourish and define one’s sense of self, a motive that is 
independent of whether the act of defiance succeeds in initiating change. Consistent with this, 
Hornsey, Majkut, Terry, and McKimmie (2003) found that people with a strong moral basis for 
their attitude on a social issue were keener to engage in public (but not private) collective action 
when they were led to believe they held a minority position than when they were led to believe 
that they held a majority position. This public act of counter-conformity was not driven by a desire 
to influence others or to recruit people to their position, suggesting that value expression was a 
valuable motive per se. Indeed, the mere expression of voice may be cathartic for people who feel 
they are subjected to unfair policies or procedures (Folger, 1977; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Lind, 
Kanfer, & Earley, 1990).  
 
Collective actions are likely to vary considerably in the extent to which they are felt to be effective 
forums for expressing individual values. For example, people might feel that a rally misrepresents 
their values, whether because of the content of speeches, the content of placards, or the choice of 
protest strategy in which the group engages (e.g., peaceful protest as opposed to formal 
blockading; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Indeed, if the attitudes and values expressed by a collective 
act misrepresent the attitudes and values of individual protestors, the level of frustration and threat 
could be considerable (Hornsey, Blackwood, & O’Brien, in press). It seems reasonable, then, that 
the likelihood of people engaging in collective action might vary as a function of the perceived 
effectiveness of the collective act in expressing their individual values. 
 
In summary, we argue that there are at least four goals of collective action and, by extension, four 
criteria by which the effectiveness of collective action can be judged. These are (1) the extent to 
which the relevant outgroup (e.g., policy makers) would be influenced by the collective action 
(intergroup concerns), (2) the extent to which relevant third parties would be influenced by the 
collective action (broader societal concerns), (3) the extent to which the collective action would be 
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successful in building an oppositional movement (intragroup concerns), and (4) the extent to 
which the collective action would be successful in expressing one’s values (individual concerns). 
We examined the links between each of these perceptions of effectiveness and future intentions to 
engage in collective action, using an anti-globalization rally as the context. 
 
The Current Study 
In 2001, Brisbane, Australia was to be the venue for a Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (CHOGM), a reunion of heads of state of members of the Commonwealth (the former 
British Empire) with the goal of discussing cultural, economic, and political themes pertinent to 
member states. In the months leading up to the meeting, there was a well-publicized effort to 
organize blockades, sit-ins, and marches designed to disrupt CHOGM. Although there were a 
disparate number of groups planning to protest, and the content of people’s concerns differed 
widely, the broad aims of the planned collective action was to protest against economic rationalism 
and globalization. This event was part of a series of high-profile anti-globalization protests that 
had taken place around the world since the late 1990s. With just weeks to go until the meeting was 
due to start, security fears regarding the planned protests increased to such a degree that CHOGM 
was cancelled. Regardless, on the date that the meeting was due to begin, a demonstration was 
organized around themes of global justice. A rally was held in the morning, consisting of an hour 
and a half of speeches and then an hour-long march through the city center. The march ended in a 
local park at which speeches, protest songs, and so forth continued for the afternoon. 
Approximately 2000 people attended the rally (“Protest March”, 2001), and these people formed 
the population of interest for the current study. 
 
A sample of protestors were given questionnaires in which we asked them the extent to which they 
identified as an activist, and the extent to which they felt the rally had been effective in achieving 
each of the goals described above. We then asked participants the extent to which they intended to 
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attend future, related protests over the next six months. On the basis of Simon and colleagues’ 
work on the dual pathway model (Simon et al., 1998; Sturmer et al., 2003; Sturmer & Simon, 
2004), we expected that participants would express stronger intentions to engage in future 
collective action the more they identified as an activist. We also predicted that there would be a 
positive relationship between the four ratings of effectiveness and intentions, independent of 
activist identification. Given a paucity of previous research on the topic, we were not in a position 
to make strong predictions about whether some conceptualizations of effectiveness would be more 
predictive of intentions than others. 
 
We did, however, expect that the various measures of effectiveness might be more predictive for 
some protestors than for others. Specifically, we distinguish between protestors who attended the 
rally as members of an organized activist group and those who attended as unaligned 
individuals. One possible difference between these sub-samples of the population is that group 
members have presumably internalized a need for organized protest and consolidated social 
movements to a greater extent than have non-members. With their greater focus on group agency, 
it seems reasonable to expect that ratings of the effectiveness of the rally in terms of intergroup 
considerations (influencing opposition groups) and intragroup considerations (building an 
oppositional movement) might be more strongly linked to intentions for members than for non-
members. In contrast, it could be that non-members will be more swayed by individual 
considerations (e.g., expressing values) than would members.  
 
Method 
Recruitment of Participants 
Six recruiters identified by university name badges and clipboards approached protesters in the 
morning and afternoon during the speeches. Participants were given the questionnaire as they sat 
listening to the speeches. At the same time, participants were provided with an information sheet 
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describing the nature of the study and the research team, and providing contact information 
through which participants could be informed of future results. Two hundred and thirty-one 
protesters participated in the survey. Given the rally was estimated to be 2000 people strong, this 
represents approximately 12% of all the people who attended across the three events. Respondents 
had a median age of 26 years, ranging from 11 to 70 years. Nine individuals did not note their sex; 
of the remaining, 42% were men (n = 94) and 58% women (n = 128). 
 
Materials 
The questionnaire consisted of a single page labeled “School of Psychology, University of 
Queensland”. Participants first indicated their sex and age, and then indicated whether or not they 
were attending the rally as a member of an organization/collective. Ninety participants (39% of the 
sample) answered yes and 141 (61%) answered no. Those who answered yes were asked to 
indicate of which organization or collective they were members. Over 40 organizations were 
nominated, and no single organization was mentioned by more than 11 participants. The ratio of 
males to females in each sub-sample was roughly equivalent (60% members female, 56% non-
members female). Members (M = 28.44) and non-members (M = 29.88) were also similar in age, 
t(222) = 0.90, p = .37. 
 
Activist identification was measured using four items: “I identify as an activist,” “I feel similar to 
activists,” “I am a typical activist”, and “Being an activist is an important part of who I am” (-3 = 
strongly disagree, 3 = strongly agree; α = .89). To measure effectiveness, we asked participants to 
indicate the extent to which they thought the protests would be effective in “influencing 
government leaders and policy makers”, “influencing public opinion”, “building an oppositional 
movement”, and “expressing certain values” that they hold. Participants responded on scales 
ranging from –3 (“counter productive”) to 0 (“no impact”) to +3 (“very effective”). These items 
were each designed to tap into the four dimensions of effectiveness defined earlier: influencing 
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outgroups, influencing third parties, building an oppositional movement, and expressing values, 
respectively. The four effectiveness measures inter-correlated moderately (r ranging from .20 - 
.46; see Table 1 for a summary of inter-correlations among all measures). Finally, participants 
completed a three-item measure of future protest intentions.  Participants indicated the likelihood 
that they would “attend next year’s CHOGM protests”, “attend protests on this theme in the next 6 
months”, and “attend protests in general in the next 6 months” (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely; 
α = .83).  
 
Results 
Examination of Means 
The sample scored significantly above the mid-point of the scale in terms of activist identification, 
M = 0.70, SD = 1.50, t(217) = 6.94, p < .001, and future intentions, M = 5.66, SD = 1.42, t(216) = 
17.24, p < .001. Participants were also relatively optimistic about the effectiveness of the rally in 
terms of influencing government leaders and policy makers (M = 0.66, SD = 1.21), influencing 
public opinion (M = 1.36, SD = 0.99), building an oppositional movement (M = 1.75, SD = 1.04), 
and expressing values (M = 2.07, SD = 0.93). In all cases, the ratings of effectiveness lay 
significantly above the mid-point of the scale (ts ranging from 8.28 to 33.56, ps < .001). 
 
Before examining the relation between ratings of effectiveness and intentions, we first tested 
whether members and non-members differed on the key measures. Members and non-members did 
not differ in the extent to which they believed the rally would be effective in influencing 
government leaders and policy makers, t(227) = -0.97, p = .34, or the extent to which they believed 
it was effective in expressing values, t(226) = -1.53, p = .13. Significant differences did emerge, 
though, on ratings of activist identification, t(216) = -4.78, p < .001, perceived effectiveness in 
influencing public opinion, t(227) = -3.96, p < .001, perceived effectiveness in building an 
oppositional movement, t(226) = -2.34, p = .020, and future intentions, t(215) = -5.02, p < .001. 
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Members had stronger activist identities (M = 1.28), believed the rally would be more effective in 
influencing public opinion (M = 1.67), believed the rally would be more effective in building an 
oppositional movement (M = 1.94), and had stronger intentions to engage in collective action in 
the future (M = 6.23) than did non-members (M = 0.33, 1.16, 1.62, and 5.29 respectively). 
 
Predicting Intentions 
Hierarchical multiple regression was performed using participants’ future intentions to engage in 
collective action as the criterion (see Table 2). In the first step, group membership (dummy coded 
such that 0 = non-members, 1 = members), activist identification, and the four measures of 
effectiveness were entered as predictors. These predictors accounted for a significant amount of 
variance, but only three variables contributed uniquely to the prediction of future intentions: group 
membership, activist identification, and perceived effectiveness in building an oppositional 
movement. As described above, the effect of group membership reflects the fact that members had 
stronger intentions to engage in collective action in the future than did non-members. Participants 
also had stronger intentions to engage in collective action the stronger their activist identity and the 
more they felt the rally was effective in building an oppositional movement.  
 
In the second step of the analysis, five product terms were entered representing the interaction 
between group membership and each of the predictors used in the first step (in line with 
recommendations by Aiken & West, 1991, continuous variables were centered). The inclusion of 
the interaction terms resulted in a significant increase in variance explained. Three of the 
interaction terms contributed uniquely to the model, representing the interaction between group 
membership and, respectively, effectiveness in influencing public opinion, effectiveness in 
building an oppositional movement, and effectiveness in expressing values.  
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We analyzed simple slopes by performing regressions separately at each level of group 
membership (see Table 3 for a summary of results). Non-members expressed stronger intentions to 
engage in collective action the more they thought the rally was effective in influencing public 
opinion and the more they thought it was effective in expressing their values. Beliefs about how 
effective the rally was in influencing government and building an oppositional movement were not 
unique predictors of intentions for non-members. For members, the only effectiveness measure to 
influence their future intentions was the perceived effectiveness of the rally in building an 
oppositional movement. The more effective the rally was in building an oppositional movement, 
the more they intended to engage in future collective action in the future. Both members and non-
members expressed stronger future intentions the stronger their identification as activists. 
 
Discussion 
Both qualitative (e.g., Klandermans & Oegema, 1987) and quantitative research (e.g., Fox & 
Schofield, 1989) suggest that perceptions of effectiveness might play only a limited role in 
explaining why people are or are not willing to engage in collective action. Indeed, recent evidence 
suggests that perceptions of effectiveness have no predictive power with regard to intentions to 
engage in collective action over and above people’s identification as an activist (Kelly & 
Breinlinger, 1995b; Sturmer et al., 2003; Sturmer, & Simon, 2004). One possible reason for the 
limited support for the role of effectiveness is that effectiveness has been narrowly defined in 
terms of perceptions of influence over the relevant outgroups (e.g., government leaders, policy 
makers). We argue that a broader conceptualization of what an effective piece of collective action 
represents to people might help uncover relationships between collective action and willingness to 
engage in collective action. Specifically, we argue that there are at least four ways in which 
effectiveness can be conceptualized: in terms of influencing outgroups, influencing third parties, 
building an oppositional movement, and expressing values. 
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Data gathered among attendees at a rally lend support to the utility of a broad conceptualization of 
effectiveness. It is interesting to note that, if effectiveness had been measured in the spirit of the 
bulk of previous research – that is, in terms of whether the rally would be successful in influencing 
outgroups – no relationship would have emerged between effectiveness and intentions. On one 
hand, this result might seem surprising. The rally was organized in response to a planned meeting 
of heads of government, with the implicit (and at times explicit) agenda of pressuring heads of 
government to address social justice issues. One might think, then, that an important criterion for 
success might be the extent to which government leaders and policy makers would be influenced 
by the message and power that the collective action represented. However, the results suggest that 
this was not an important consideration when people were reporting whether they intended to 
engage in future collective action. 
 
On the other hand, this result makes a degree of intuitive sense. When people rally against 
globalization, only the most optimistic of protestors would believe that their actions could reverse 
global macroeconomic policy, and to judge the success of a rally entirely on this basis would more 
often than not lead to disappointment. Similarly, when people protested against the impending war 
in Iraq, many would have done so with the knowledge that their actions would have very limited 
impact on whether or not the war commenced. Yet many people protested all the same, which 
suggests that the rallies were fulfilling functions other than influencing policy makers.  
 
The current data suggest three alternative dimensions on which effectiveness might be judged, and 
provide evidence that each of these contributes in some way to influencing protestors’ future 
intentions. For example, our sample expressed stronger intentions to participate in collective action 
the more they felt the current rally was effective in building an oppositional movement. Rather 
than focusing on whether the rally was effective in influencing outgroups, respondents seem to be 
focusing on the effectiveness of the rally in galvanizing a critical mass of opposition, a platform 
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from which future influence attempts can be launched. In other words, rather than focusing on the 
short-term effects of the rally on external parties, people are motivated by the perceived success of 
the rally in consolidating the movement, with a view to implementing change in the medium to 
long term. This suggests that protestors themselves should be seen as potential targets of the rally, 
alongside outgroups and third parties, a phenomenon that has been obscured in the past by overly 
narrow or abstract definitions of effectiveness. 
 
It should be noted, though, that the focus on building an oppositional movement was only 
predictive of intentions for a subset of our sample. For people who were members of an 
organization, effectiveness in terms of building an oppositional movement was a powerful 
predictor of intentions. Indeed, this construct was the only index of effectiveness that seemed to 
matter to members when it came to predicting future intentions. The effectiveness of the rally in 
influencing the general public or expressing values played no role at all when other factors were 
taken into account.  
 
For non-members, a quite different pattern emerged in terms of what dimensions of effectiveness 
encourage people to engage in collective action in the future. In terms of predicting intentions, 
non-members were not influenced by whether the rally was effective in influencing government or 
building an oppositional movement. They were, however, more likely to engage in future 
collective action the more they felt the rally was effective in influencing the general public. As 
pointed out by Simon and Klandermans (2001), a mark of a politicized intergroup struggle is that 
protagonists try to enlist the sympathies of, and the support of, third parties. On the surface, this 
might be why rallies are often preceded by marches. Although the end point of a march might 
involve rallying around a symbolic hub of power (e.g., a government building), the march is 
designed to attract attention to the cause among neutral bystanders. Again, operationalizations of 
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effectiveness that focus on influencing outgroups would not necessarily detect the importance of 
this process in predicting intentions. 
 
Another factor that underpinned non-members’ intentions was the extent to which the rally was 
effective in expressing their values. As has been pointed out by some attitude theorists (e.g., 
Anderson & Kristiansen, 1990; Herek, 1987; Katz, 1960), attitudes have an expressive function in 
that they act as a marker of group membership and/or personal values. When attitudes are 
expressed publicly, they might be especially nourishing in terms of defining who you are and what 
you stand for (Hornsey et al., 2003; Tice, 1992). Furthermore, when values are expressed en 
masse, it provides a voice for many people who otherwise might feel voiceless, and this might in 
itself be rewarding regardless of whether or not the voice influences others. To a degree, then, 
protestors are positioning themselves not just as opponents of the government, but also as 
opposites, providing a symbolic counterpoint to the status quo. Consistent with this notion, non-
members reported stronger intentions to engage in future collective action the more effective the 
rally was seen to be in expressing their values, and this effect emerged over and above perceptions 
of influence.  
 
One possible reason why our effects were moderated by group membership is that members and 
non-members have different psychological orientations when it comes to collective action. It could 
be that members are more focused on group agency than are non-members, and so judge 
effectiveness more in intragroup terms. Having already internalized the value of, and desire for, 
organized resistance, it is perhaps not surprising that members should view building an 
oppositional movement as a particularly powerful criterion for success. In contrast, it could be that 
non-members have less of a group orientation, leading them to focus more on broader societal 
concerns (e.g., influencing third parties) and individual concerns (e.g., value expression). It is 
important, however, not to automatically assume that this is explaining the observed pattern of 
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results. An alternative explanation is that members of organized groups expect to engage in 
collective action over multiple future events and accordingly may be more focused on the long 
term effectiveness of the rally in building an oppositional movement. In contrast, unaligned 
individuals drawn to the rally (non-members) might be less mindful of the long term nature of 
intergroup struggle and so might be drawn to more immediate considerations such as influencing 
third parties or expressing values as key criteria for effectiveness. Further research and theory 
building is required to uncover the psychological underpinnings of why members and non-
members appear to focus on different dimensions of effectiveness when determining future 
intentions. 
 
It should be noted that, consistent with previous work (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995b; Simon et al., 
1998; Sturmer et al., 2003; Sturmer, & Simon, 2004), identification as an activist was by far the 
most powerful predictor of intentions. In line with the social identity perspective, this suggests that 
self-categorization processes and identity issues have a profound effect on people’s behavioral 
expectations of themselves. But, unlike many previous studies (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995b; 
Sturmer et al., 2003; Sturmer, & Simon, 2004), the effects of activist identification did not erase 
other more instrumental concerns regarding effectiveness. There is no support, then, for the notion 
that activists respond automatically to a behavioural script without reference to “rational” 
considerations; rather, it seems that identity considerations and effectiveness considerations 
contribute independently and uniquely to people’s willingness to engage in collective action. 
Although this project was not designed as an explicit test of Simon and colleagues’ dual pathway 
model of collective action (Simon et al., 1998), it is clear that the results provide support for this 
model. 
 
On an applied level, the current data have implications for those attempting to recruit participants 
in collective action. Specifically, it suggests that organizers of collective action might benefit from 
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tailoring their campaigns to suit their target audience. When recruiting from members of organized 
groups, organizers might be best advised to attend to the utility of the action in building an 
oppositional movement (“From little things big things grow”). When attempting to recruit from 
those who are not members of organized groups, organizers might attend to different outcomes 
such as influencing the general public (“send a message to all Australians”) or expressing values 
(“have your say”). According to our data, attempts to recruit participants by focusing exclusively 
on influencing opposition groups (“Stop war”; “Ban nuclear weapons”) might be less strategically 
effective in terms of attracting participants to collective action. 
 
As in any study conducted in the field, however, a degree of common sense and caution should be 
exercised when attempting to generalize results from this study into other contexts. One notable 
feature of the rally in this study is that its themes – social justice and anti-globalization – were 
relatively diffuse and embraced a range of disparate issues. In these circumstances, it is possible 
that people would have been particularly attentive to whether the rally was effective in coalescing 
individual protestors into a coherent oppositional movement. If the collective action was engaged 
in by a group that already had well defined boundaries and was guided by a tight set of unifying 
principles, or was being conducted by a single organization, then the perceived utility of the action 
in terms of rallying internal support and building an oppositional movement might be less 
predictive of future intentions. Furthermore, the themes of the rally under investigation were so 
ambitious that it might not make much sense to think of effectiveness in terms of immediate 
influence over policy makers. In this case, we might see more of a focus on long-term goals (e.g., 
building an oppositional movement) or symbolic processes (e.g., expressing values) than if the 
goal of collective action was in immediate reach. If the collective action focused on a specific, 
concrete, and achievable aim (e.g., protesting against the building of a highway, or campaigning 
for a pay rise) then non-material benefits such as expression of values might become less 
 22
important – and less predictive of intentions – than more immediate considerations such as 
whether the collective action would be effective in influencing the relevant outgroup. 
 
This study carries with it some methodological limitations necessitated by the field context in 
which the research was conducted. For example, although protestors in the rally were approached 
at random, we have no way of knowing whether the respondents were representative of the 
broader population of protestors. Another limitation is that the measures of effectiveness were 
obtained using single items. Although this is not ideal, it should be noted that this limitation should 
have the effect of providing weaker support for the role of effectiveness relative to the multi-item 
measure of activist identification than one might expect if more sophisticated measurements were 
used. We acknowledge, however, that the relationship between indices of effectiveness and protest 
intentions reported here might fluctuate depending on how the relevant perceptions are 
operationalized. It can be argued that this is particularly the case with the “expressing values” 
item. Although this item was designed to refer to the expression of personal values – and thus was 
assumed to be acting in the service of an individual, intrapsychic need for self-expression - it is 
possible that the item could have been interpreted by some as referring to collective values. In 
future, it would be beneficial to see if the current findings can be replicated with less ambiguous 
multi-item scales. Finally, we acknowledge that although one’s intention to engage in collective 
action represents a predictor of behavior, it is not a proxy for behavior. Future research is required 
to demonstrate that the role of effectiveness in predicting intentions translates into concrete action. 
 
We also acknowledge that the dimensions of effectiveness described above are not exhaustive of 
the needs or goals that might be fulfilled by political protest and/or social movement participation. 
There may be other motivations that have yet to be discussed, including gaining social support and 
developing a sense of meaning. Theorizing about the definition of effectiveness in collective 
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action is still in its infancy, and so we view this paper as a stimulus for further questioning and 
theorizing rather than a definitive summary. 
 
Despite these limitations, the current data suggest that researchers can benefit from revisiting the 
role of effectiveness in explaining why people do or do not engage in collective action. With the 
literature increasingly emphasising the role of identity processes in collective action, the current 
data uncover rational bases for collective action that until now have been overlooked. By 
broadening our conceptualization of what criteria people use to judge effectiveness, it is hoped that 
fresh insights can be gained into what drives people to engage in collective action, even when the 
hopes of influencing key decision makers appear forlorn.  
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Footnotes 
1. Our argument here is analogous to work on the multiple functions of group membership (e.g., 
Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999), which argues that identification with groups not 
only serves a self-esteem function via intergroup comparisons, but also fulfils a range of 
other motivations, some of which are intragroup in nature. 
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Table 1  
Intercorrelations Among Variables 
   2 3 4 5 6 
1. Activist Identification .11 .34*** .53*** .29*** .63*** 
2. Influencing Government  .42*** .32*** .20** .10 
3. Influencing Public   .46*** .44*** .36***  
4. Building Opposition    .41*** .48***  
5. Expressing Values     .32*** 
6. Future Intentions  
Note. ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
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Table 2  
Hierarchical Regression of Group, Activist Identification, and Effectiveness on Future Intentions 
 Variable                                β             SE         R2ch       Fch            df 
Step 1 Group .12* .16 .46 29.00*** 6, 207 
 Activist Identification .47*** .06 
 Influencing Government -.06 .07 
 Influencing Public .07 .09 
 Building Opposition .16* .09 
 Expressing Values .08 .09 
Step 2 Group x Activist Identification -.02 .12 .05 4.03** 5, 202 
 Group x Influencing Government .02 .14 
 Group x Influencing Public -.22** .19 
 Group x Building Opposition .19* .19 
 Group x Expressing Values -.18* .20 
* p < .05 **p < .01  ***p < .001 
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Table 3 
Relationship Among Activist Identification, Effectiveness, and Future Intentions For Members and 
Non-Members 
 
                          Group membership 
         Members         Non-Members 
    β                 SE          β             SE 
Activist Identification .52*** .08 .44*** .08 
Influencing Government -.12 .09 -.12 .10 
Influencing Public -.13 .12 .24* .14 
Building Opposition .43*** .12 .06 .13 
Expressing Values -.15 .14 .17* .11 
* p < .05, ***p < .001 
 
